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Abstract
In this article, overlapping generations are extracting a natural resource over an
inÞnite future. We examine the fair allocation of resource and compensations among
generations. Fairness is deÞned by core lower bounds and aspiration upper bounds.
The core lower bounds require that every coalition of generations obtains at least what
it could achieve by itself. The aspiration upper bounds require that no coalition of
generations enjoys a higher welfare than it would achieve if nobody else extracted the
resource. We show that, upon existence, the allocation that satisÞes the two fairness cri-
teria is unique and assigns to each generation its marginal contribution to the preceding
generation. Finally, we describe the dynamics of such an allocation.
1 Introduction
Sustainable development is deÞned by the Brundtland Report as “development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs”. In an economy with natural resources, this deÞnition of sustainable development
may require that present generations abstain from extracting any resources. Indeed, as long
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as a resource is scarce in the precise sense that every generation cannot meet its own resource
needs, meeting the needs of present generations would compromise the ability of future gener-
ations to meet their own needs. Therefore, natural resource scarcity implies that sustainable
development as deÞned above is impossible.
One way to reconcile the above deÞnition of sustainable development with scarce natural
resource is to consider the welfare equivalent of resource needs. Indeed, meeting future gen-
eration’s needs requires that the present generations reduce their extraction and, therefore,
consume less than their needs, which in turn reduces their welfare. Yet they might enjoy as
much welfare as if they were to consume the amount necessary to meet their needs if future
generations transfer part of their welfare derived from resource extraction. The welfare of
present generations who do not extract too much of a resource is then preserved through
compensations from future generations. However, the compensation made by future genera-
tions to present ones should not be too high, since otherwise, it would compromise their own
welfare.
We examine fair paths of extraction and compensations in a natural resource economy
by considering two fairness criteria. The Þrst criterion is the so-called core lower bound.
It requires that the welfare of any generation or group of generations not be lower than
what it could achieve by itself. The theoretical background of this criterion is a Þctitious
negotiation in which all generations are able to meet, agree on an extraction path and carry out
compensations among themselves. We impose the condition that any generation or coalition
of generations should obtain at least what it would get as a result of this negotiation.
The second fairness criterion hinges on a solidarity principle and is named the aspiration
upper bound. It requires that no generation or group of generations enjoys a welfare higher
than its aspiration welfare, i.e. the welfare it would achieve if no other generation were to
extract the resource. The scarcity of the resource is here important since, by deÞnition, not
all generations can achieve their aspiration welfare. The aspiration upper bound thus features
some intergenerational solidarity.
We show that, upon existence, a unique extraction path and vector of compensations
satisfy the two fairness criteria. Each generation is assigned a welfare that is equal to its
marginal contribution to the preceding generation. We also describe the dynamics of the
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fair extraction path and the compensations. Notably, compensations are shown to increase
over time for at least the Þrst generations, which brings into question their feasibility: some
generations might not be able to produce enough goods from the resource stock to pay previous
generations back. As a consequence, fair allocation might not exist. We provide examples
where it does exist and others where it does not. Finally, we show that if there is no technical
progress on resource productivity, the welfare of generations decreases over time.
Our paper combines two streams of literature that deal with the management of natural
resources in a normative way. On the one hand, axiomatic theory of justice has recently
been applied by Bossert et al. (2007), Roemer and Suzumura (2007) and Asheim (2007)
in order to compare welfare among generations. On the other hand, dynamic programming
methods have been used to solve the social planner’s problem, featuring a representative
inÞnitely-lived individual maximizing the sum of a discounted ßow of utilities. Pioneer works
have been proposed by Dasgupta and Heal (1974) and Solow (1974) for exhaustible resources
and these have been extended in many directions. Among them, most notably, is the use of
the vintage structure of the population by Marini and Scaramozzino (1995). By combining
these two approaches, our fairness axioms thus depend not only on preferences but also on
technological constraints and on the resource dynamics. From these axioms, we are then in a
position to analyze the fairness properties of extraction paths and intergenerational sharing
of welfare.
It should be noted that, in the literature, most of the axioms deÞning intergenerational
fairness treat generations symmetrically. They consider generations behind a “veil of igno-
rance” with regard to their position on the time scale, which implies that earlier generations
should not be favored over later generations and vice versa. Here, in contrast, the two fair-
ness principles treat generations asymmetrically and acknowledge the priority access of the
earlier generations to the natural resource. We believe that the sequence of extraction and
the dynamics of the resource are two important features of the problem. They characterize
the rights and duties of generations in the intergenerational sharing of a natural resource.
Concerning the rights, the laissez-faire extraction outcome deÞnes legitimate rights on the re-
source which, when translated into welfare, lead to the core lower bounds. These rights are de
facto resource endowments in an intergenerational exchange economy. By agreeing to reduce
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their resource extraction when young in exchange for a compensation when old, a generation
trades part of its resource endowment against consumption. The core lower bounds restrict
the allocation of a resource and consumption within the core of this particular exchange econ-
omy. In the tradition of the general equilibrium theory, being in the core can be viewed as an
attractive fairness principle: a coalition of generations would object to an allocation that is
not in the core by arguing that it can achieve a higher welfare by sharing its own endowment
among its members. The duties of present generations toward future ones is deÞned by the
solidarity principle. By upper bounding welfare, earlier generations are forbidden from taking
advantage of their priority on the resource by getting too much welfare from the trading with
future generations.1 In a nutshell, the core lower bounds favor earlier generations while the
aspiration upper bounds protect later ones.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the model while Sections 3 and 4
deÞne the fairness principles. In Section 5, we characterize the fair allocation of resources and
compensations. We describe its dynamics and discuss its existence in Section 6. Conclusions
are given in Section 7.
2 Model
A natural resource is exploited by successive overlapping generations indexed by their birth
date w 5 N+. Let n0 be the initial stock of resource and  its regeneration rate with   1
(the case  = 1 corresponds to an exhaustible resource). Let {w denote the amount of the
resource extracted at date w. The dynamics of the resource stock is given by the following law
of motion:
nw+1 = (nw  {w) (1)
Each generation w lives through two periods, youth and old age. It exploits the resource
when young as an input to produce consumption units through a production function iw. We
1They might easily end up with more than their aspiration welfare when trading the resource against
consumption in competitive markets. In a resource-sharing problem (with an exhaustible resource and a Þnite
number of agents) with a concave and single peak preference similar to that of the present paper, Ambec
(2008) shows that the Walrasian allocation with equal division of the resource violates the aspiration upper
bounds.
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assume that iw is strictly concave and increasing up to a maximal production level iw ({ˆw) and
then decreasing. Formally i 0w({w) A 0 for all {w ? {ˆw, i 0w({ˆw) = 0, i 0w({w) ? 0 for all {w A {ˆw,
and i 00w ({w) ? 0.2 The extraction level {ˆw is called generation w’s optimal extraction. We
also assume that iw(0) = 0 and i 0w(0) = +4 for all w. Coexisting generations might perform
transfers among themselves. A generation w might share its production when young with old
people from the preceding generation. Let pw denote the consumption units transferred by
the generation w when young to the generation w 1 when old. Thus, generation w consumes
iw({w)pw when young and pw+1 when old. Without loss of generality p0> which denotes the
Þrst transfer made by the generation 0 to the generation born in 1 is normalized to zero,
since the welfare of generation 1 is not considered here. Let w be the individual discount
rate, i.e. the value in terms of the intertemporal utility at time w of a marginal increase in the
instantaneous utility at time w + 1. We assume that 0 ? w ? 1. Generation w’s consumption
from resource exploitation, hereafter referred to as “utility”, viewed at date w with {w units
extracted and transfers pw and pw+1, is:
xw = iw({w)pw + wpw+1= (2)
We assume that the resource is scarce in the sense that all generations cannot extract enough
to meet their demands {ˆw. More precisely, there exists w˜ 5 N++ such that if all generations
w ? w˜ extract {ˆw, the resource available for generation w˜ is strictly lower than generation w˜’s
optimal extraction {ˆw˜. Formally, <w˜ such that w˜n0 
Pw˜31
w=0 w˜3w{ˆw ? {ˆw˜.
In this set-up with a scarce resource and transferable utility, the selÞsh outcome under
autarky is ine!cient (Pareto-dominated) as the following argument shows. Under autarky,
it is optimal for each generation w to extract the resource up to {ˆw= They therefore enjoy
iw({ˆw) consumption units or utility at time w. Generation w˜ extracts the remaining resource
w˜n0
Pw˜31
w=0 w˜3w{ˆw, thereby exhausting the resource and leaving nothing for future generations,
who therefore obtain iw(0) for all w A w˜. Given that iw is concave with i 0w(0) = +4, total
production from resource extraction up to a date later than w˜ can be increased if at least one
generation o before w˜ reduces its extraction to leave some of the resource for future generations
2Negative returns above {ˆw can be due to production costs that exceed the beneÞts from resource extraction,
e.g. bottleneck eects on complementary inputs (e.g. labor or capital) that render the resource unproductive
but nonetheless costly to extract.
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after w˜. The increased production can be shared among generations through transfers pw so
that every generation becomes better o at least weakly, and strongly for some of them.
We examine coordinated extractions and transfers among generations. Generations agree
on an allocation {{w> pw}w=0>===>+" that assigns resource extraction levels and intergenerational
transfers for every generation w. The allocation {{w> pw} must satisfy the following feasibility
conditions for all w 5 N+:
0  {w  nw> (3)
0  pw  iw({w)= (4)
The Þrst feasibility condition (3) ensures that the (non-negative) amount of resource extracted
does not exceed the stock available at date w. The second feasibility condition (4) ensures that
the (non-negative) transfer to the old of the previous generation is lower than the consumption
goods produced at date w.
3 Core lower bounds
Our Þrst fairness criterion refers to a Þctitious cooperative game. Suppose that all generations
can meet to agree on an allocation. A core allocation of the Þctitious cooperative game is
such that any coalition of generations obtains at least what it could obtain on its own, i.e. by
coordinating extraction and carrying out transfers among its members. It satisÞes the core
lower bound, deÞned as the highest welfare that a coalition can achieve on its own, for any
arbitrary coalition.
In the Þctitious cooperative game, generations can share the beneÞt from resource ex-
traction without constraints: transfers can be carried out among generations that are not
contemporaneous in reality. More importantly, non-contemporaneous generations might ben-
eÞt from coordinated extraction and share this beneÞt through transfers. In cooperative game
theory terms, non-consecutive coalitions can create value. Of course, in the Þctitious cooper-
ative game, the sequence of extraction remains Þxed: generations cannot exchange the timing
of their extraction.
A coalition of generations is a non-empty subset of N+. Given two coalitions V and W ,
we write V ? W if l ? m for all l 5 V and all m 5 W . Given a coalition V, the Þrst and the
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last generation in V are denoted by minV and maxV respectively. Let Sl = {1> = = = > l} denote
the set of predecessors of generation l, and S 0l = Sl\{l} the set of strict predecessors of
generation l. Similarly, let Il = {l> l + 1> = = = > q} denote the set of followers of generation l,
and I 0l = Il\{l} the set of strict followers of generation l. We often omit set brackets for
sets and write l instead of {l}, or y(l> m) instead of y({l> m}). A coalition V is consecutive (or
connected) if for all l> m 5 V and all n 5 Q , l ? n ? m implies n 5 V.
We need to deÞne the highest welfare that a coalition can achieve on its own in the Þctitious
cooperative game. This is a cooperative game with externalities: the welfare of a coalition
V depends on extraction strategy by generations outside of V through the stock of resource
available to V. We assume that the outsiders behave non-cooperatively by extracting the
resource under autarky. Consider a coalition V. Without loss of generality, let us assign a
weight w to agent w 5 V. The welfare of V is
P
wMV
wxw. It means that 1 unit of utility transferred
by generation w to generation w + m is valuated at w+m@w units. The value of w is obviously
an important issue and, in the rest of this paper, we assume that relative weights equal the
generation’s discount factor, i.e. w@w31 = w31. Let us now explain our choice. First, replace
the utility of each generation belonging to the coalition in the welfare function to obtain:
X
wMV
w [iw ({w)pw + wpw+1] = (5)
If the coalition embodies consecutive generations, V = {minV> ===>maxV}, equation (5) can
be rewritten (up to a constant) as follows:
X
wMV
w
minV
iw ({w)pminV +
X
wMV
w
minV

w 
w+1
w
¸
pw+1 +
maxV
minV
maxVpmaxV+1= (6)
Hence, it is only when w@w31 = w31 that a transfer involving two coexisting generations (i.e.
a young individual born at time w and an old one born at time w  1) is neutral for welfare.
If w@w31 A w31, a transfer from a young individual to an old one has a negative impact on
welfare. Transfers are thus likely to be set to zero. Similarly, if w@w31 ? w31, the transfer
increases the coalition’s welfare. It should then be maximal. When the generations within the
coalition are not consecutive, the situation is even worse since the condition w@w31 = w31
is the only way to make the intergenerational transfer neutral for those who do not belong
to the coalition. We thus argue that the welfare of a coalition should discount the utility (or
consumption) of future generations because each individual discounts time in her or his own
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utility function. For utility (or consumption) to be transferable without e!ciency gain or loss,
we need to discount it when we compute the welfare of a coalition.3 Under this assumption
of neutral transfers, the welfare of coalition V as deÞned in (5) becomes:
X
wMV
wl=1l31iw ({w) = (7)
For expositional convenience and without loss of generality, we assume from now on that all
generations discount utility at the same rate, w = > which simpliÞes coalition V’s welfare as
deÞned in (7) to
P
wMV wiw ({w).4
Let y(V) be the value function that assigns the highest welfare to any arbitrary coalition
V. Consider a coalition of consecutive generations V = {minV> ===>maxV}. The welfare that
V can achieve depends on the stock of resource available for the Þrst generation minV. We
consider the worst possible credible5 scenario for V, one in which generations preceding the
coalition have extracted up to their their optimal level {ˆ whenever possible. Therefore, the
stock of resource, denoted nqfVminV, available for the Þrst generation minV of a coalition V is:
nqfVminV  min{minVn0 
minV31X
w=0
minV3w{ˆw> 0}=
Let {V = ({l)lMV be the resource allocation assigned to members of V. The welfare y(V)
valued at date 0 that the consecutive coalition V can achieve on its own is:
y(V) = max
{V
X
wMV
wiw({w)>
v=w=
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
nw+1 =  (nw  {w) >
nw  {w  0> nw  0>
nminV = nqfVminV=
(8)
3A consistent explanation for both individual and social discounting relies on the possibility, at each period
of time, of the end of the world (Dasgupta and Heal, 1974 and 1979). The discount rate is then the world’s
survival probability and, provided that the utility is zero in the case of a collapse, objectives (2) and (5) can
be seen as expected utility functions. Equalizing the individual and coalition discount rates would, in this
case, be reasonable.
4This assumption is not needed for the proof of Proposition 1, which therefore holds for heterogenous
discount rates.
5Extracting more than {ˆw is not credible for a generation w since it reduces production and therefore utility.
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The constraints on the maximization program are the resource dynamics, the feasibility and
the initial resource stock conditions respectively. In particular, for singletons V = {l}, we
have
y(l) = il(min{{ˆl> nqfl })=
For any arbitrary coalition V, let C(V) = {Wo}Oo=1, where W1 ? W2 ? === ? WO denotes the set of
connected components of V, i.e. C(V) is the coarsest partition of V such that any Wo 5 C(V)
is connected. Since the generations between two consecutive sub-coalitions Wo31> Wo 5 C(V)
extract up to their optimal level {ˆ, given the resource stock nmaxWo left by the last generation
in Wo, the resource stock available for Wo for o = 2> ===> O is
nqfVminWo  min
;
?
=
(minWo3maxWo31+1)nmaxWo31+1 
minWo31X
w=maxWo31+1
(minWo3w){ˆw> 0
<
@
> =
The welfare y(V) valued at date 0 that V can achieve on its own is thus:
y(V) = max
{V
X
wMV
wiw({w)>
v=w=
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
nw+1 =  (nw  {w) >
nw  {w  0> nw  0>
nminWo = nqfVminWo for o = 1> ===> O
(9)
In contrast to the case of consecutive coalitions, the initial resource stock constraints are
deÞned for each consecutive component of V. Let {VV denote the solution to (9) for any
coalition V.
An important property of the value function deÞned in (9) is its superadditivity. Consider
any disjoint coalitions W> V  N+. Since the resource allocation ({WW > {VV) can be implemented
by coalition W ^ V, we have:
y(V ^ W )  y(V) + y(W )=
An allocation {{w> pw} satisÞes the core lower bounds if and only if for all coalitions V  N+
X
wMV
w (iw({w)pw + pw+1)  y(V)= (10)
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4 Aspiration upper bounds
Our second criterion is based on a solidarity principle inspired by Moulin (1990). In the
absence of other generations, a generation w would be endowed with wn0 units of the resource,
which is the “natural” stock. It could enjoy the beneÞt of extracting this resource stock up
to its optimal level {ˆw. Let us call this beneÞt valued at date 0 the generation w’s aspiration
welfare, and let it be denoted by Z (w) = wiw(min{wn0> {ˆw}). Since the resource is scarce
in the precise sense that wn0 
Pw31
m=0 m3w{ˆm ? {ˆw for all w  w˜, it is impossible for every
generation to be assigned its aspiration welfare.6 In Moulin (1990)’s terms, the sustainable
resource exploitation problem exhibits negative group externalities. Because no particular
generation bears any distinct responsibility for these externalities, it is only natural to ask
for every generation to accept a share of it: no generation should end up above its aspiration
welfare. This argument can be generalized to coalitions in a very natural way. The aspiration
welfare of an arbitrary coalition V is the highest welfare it could achieve in the absence of
other generations.7
In contrast to the core lower bounds y(V), coalition V inherits from an untouched resource
when the aspiration welfare is computed. Formally, coalition V has access to minVn0 A nqfVminV.
For connected coalitions, it is the solution to the following program:
z(V) = max
{V
X
wMV
wiw({w)>
v=w=
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
nw+1 =  (nw  {w) >
nw  {w  0> nw  0>
nminV = minVn0=
(11)
The constraints in the maximization program are the resource dynamics, the feasibility and
the initial resource stock respectively.
A disconnected coalition V that leaves some resource stock after the last generation in Wo
to supply the generations in Wo+1 experiences no extraction from outsiders. Therefore, the
6Indeed, for any w A w˜ (where w˜ is deÞned above) and consecutive coalitions w 5 V, we have Pw5V z(w) A
y(V), that is, the sum of the generations’ aspiration welfare exceeds the maximal welfare from resource
exploitation.
7Similar to the case of the core lower bounds, we allow for transfers among non-contemporaneous genera-
tions in V.
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resource stock entering Wo+1 is (minWo+13maxWo)nmaxWo . The aspiration welfare of an arbitrary
coalition V is thus:
z(V) = max
{V
X
wMV
wiw({w)>
v=w=
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
nw+1 =  (nw  {w) >
nw  {w  0> nw  0>
nminWo = (minWo+13maxWo)nmaxWo for o = 1> ===> O=
(12)
The constraints in the maximization program are the resource dynamics, the feasibility and
the initial resource stock conditions respectively. The main dierence between programs (9)
and (12) lies in the initial resource stocks that are reduced by generations outside of V in (9)
but not in (12).
An allocation {{w> pw} satisÞes the aspiration upper bounds if and only if, for all coalitions
V  N+
X
wMV
w (iw({w)pw + pw+1)  z(V)= (13)
5 A unique fair allocation
Consider the e!cient resource allocation {{Ww} solution to the maximization program deÞned
by y(N+). Formally, {{Ww} maximizes
P"
w=0 wiw({w) subject to the initial resource stock con-
straint n0, the resource dynamics constraint nw+1 = (nw  {w) and the feasibility constraints
nw  {w  0 for w = 0> 1> 2> ===. The concavity of iw ensures that {{Ww} is unique.
A transfer scheme {pw} deÞnes a distribution of the welfare from intergenerational resource
extraction. We focus on the transfer scheme that leads to the downstream welfare distribution
introduced by Ambec and Sprumont (2002). Denoted by {pWw}, it is the unique transfer scheme
in which each generation is assigned its marginal contribution to the preceding generation.
Formally, {{Ww > pWw} assigns xWw = iw({Ww )pWw + pWw+1 to every generation w 5 N+ with:
wxWw = y(Sw) y(S 0w)=
Proposition 1 If pWw  iw({Ww ) for all w 5 N+, {{Ww > pWw} is the unique allocation that satisÞes
the core lower bounds and the aspiration upper bounds.
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Proof
First, we prove that if an allocation {{w} satisÞes the core lower bounds {{w} = {{Ww}. The
core lower bounds imply that:
mX
w=0
w(iw({w)pw + pw+1)  y(Sm)>
for all m 5 N+. SincePmw=0 w(iw({w)pw + pw+1), the above inequality for m $4 leads to
"X
w=0
wiw({w) + limm3<" 
m+1pm+1  y(N+)= (14)
Since  ? 1 then limm3<" m+1 = 0 and, since the feasibility constraint (4) upper bounds
pm+1, limm3<" m+1pm+1 = 0. Therefore (14) implies
"X
w=0
wiw({w)  y(N+)>
which, when combined with the deÞnition of y(N+), implies that {{w} = {{Ww}.
Second, it is easy to see that if a welfare distribution {pw} satisÞes both the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds, then {pw} = {pWw}. This is due to the fact that
for coalitions starting from 0 up to any generation w, we have y(Sw) = z(Sw).8 Given p0,
since y(0) = z(0), we must have p1 = pW1. Let pw = pWw for all w  m + 1. The core
constraints and the aspiration upper bounds force
Pm
w=0 w(iw({Ww )  pw + pw+1) = y(Sm),
hence m(im({Wm)pm +pm+1) = y(Sm)
Pm31
w=0 w(iw({Ww )pw+pw+1). Thus by pw = pWw for
all w  m + 1, then Pm31w=0 w(iw({Ww )pw + pw+1) =Pm31w=0 w(iw({Ww )pWw + pWw+1) = y(S 0m),
we therefore obtain m(im({Wm)pm + pm+1) = y(Sm) y(S 0m), i.e. the desired conclusion.
Next, we show that {{Ww > pWw} satisÞes the core lower bounds, that is,
P
wMV wxWw  y(V) for
any coalition V where xWw  iw({Ww )pWw + pWw+1.
Before we proceed, we note the following: for all w, we have y(S 0w) + wiw({ˆw)  y(Sw).
Thus for all generations w,
wiw({ˆw)  y(Sw) y(S 0w)= (15)
8Note that the uniqueness of our solution is due the equality of the core lower bounds and aspiration
welfare upper bounds for all consecutive coalitions starting from 0, i.e. y(Sw) = z(Sw) for all w. Notably, if
we bound the size of coalitions that might be formed to say q ¿ +4, other transfer schemes might satisfy
the two fairness axioms. More precisely, pw can dier from pw for generations w A q.
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Suppose Þrst of all that V is a consecutive coalition. Since SV = S 0V ^ V, by superad-
ditivity of y, y(SV)  y(S 0V) + y(V) and PwMV wxWw = y(SV) y(S 0V), which implies thatP
wMV wxWw  y(V).
Second, consider any coalition V. Take the last generation in V that obtains some resource
o(V) = maxw{w 5 V : {Vw A 0}. If o(V) does not exist then y(V) = 0 
P
wMV wxWw . Let
V¯ = So(V)\S 0minV be the coalition of all generations from minV to o(V). Since V¯ is
connected,
P
wMV¯ wxWw = y(SV¯)  y(S 0V¯)  y(V¯). Adding
P
wMV¯\V wxWw to both sides of the
last inequality yields:
X
wMV
wxWw  y(V¯)
X
wMV¯\V
wxWw = (16)
Since generations between connected coalitions in V up to o(V) extract up to their optimal
level, the allocation ({VVKSo(V)> {ˆV\V¯) can be implemented in V¯, which implies
y(V¯)  y(V _ So(V)) +
X
wMV¯\V
iw({ˆw)= (17)
Since there is no more resource to be shared in V after o(V), iw({Vw ) = iw(0) = 0 for any
w 5 V\So(V), which therefore implies that y(V) = y(V _ So(V)). We combine (16) and (17)
to obtain
X
wMV
wxWw  y(V) +
X
wMV¯\V
w (iw({ˆw) xWw )
From (15), we know that wiw({ˆw)  wxWw for all w. Hence,
P
wMV wxWw  y(V)> which shows
that {pWw} satisÞes the core lower bounds.
Lastly, we show that {{Ww > pWw} satisÞes the aspiration upper bounds. The proof uses the
following lemma that is proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 If V  W  Q and W ? l, then z(V ^ l) z(V)  z(W ^ l) z(W ).
Then for any coalition V> we obtain
X
lMV
wxWl =
X
lMV
(z(Sl) z(S 0l)) 
X
lMV
(z(Sl _ V) z(S 0l _ V)) = z(V)>
where the inequality follows from Lemma 1 and the latter equality follows from the fact that
all terms, except z(S maxV _ V) = z(V) and z(S 0minV _ V) = z(>) = 0>cancel out. ¤
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6 Description of fair allocation
Let us now describe the unique allocation, denoted by {{Ww > pWw}, which satisÞes the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds. To proceed, we need some additional assumptions on
the time dependency of the production function. We will notably focus on the time-invariant
case such that iw ({) = iw+1 ({), which can be interpreted as the case with no technical
progress. We will then provide some intuitions on how the fair allocation is modiÞed when
some speciÞc technical progress is introduced.
Proposition 1 states that the fair path of extraction {{Ww} is an e!cient one. It can
therefore be studied independently of the fair path of transfers {pWw}. In the speciÞc case
where iw ({) = iw+1 ({), which implies that {ˆw = {ˆw+1, {{Ww} is the solution of the following
problem:
max
{{w}
"X
w=0
wi ({w) >
v=w=
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
¯¯¯
nw+1 =  (nw  {w) >
{w  0> nw  0>
n0 A 0 given.
(18)
The following Proposition characterizes the solution to problem (18).
Proposition 2 If iw ({) = i ({) for all w, the fair path of extraction {{Ww} and the stock of
resource are:
i) monotonically increasing if  A 1 with an asymptotic constant extraction path {W" = {ˆ
and n" =  1 {ˆ,
ii) monotonically decreasing if  ? 1 with a stock that is asymptotically exhausted,
iii) constant for all w if  = 1 with a constant extraction path {Ww =
³
1 1
´
n0 for all w.
Proof
To begin, let us observe that an {w is optimal if and only if it belongs to [0> {ˆ]. Suppose
by contradiction that {˜w is optimal and is such that {˜w A {ˆ. Then, there exists % A 0 such
that i ((1 %) {˜w) A i ({˜w) and  (nw  (1 %){w) A  (nw  {˜w). Hence {˜w is not optimal.
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The Þrst order condition of problem (18) is:
i 0 ({w31) i 0 ({w) = 0> (19)
for all w 5 N++> while the transversality condition is:
lim
w<+"
wi 0 ({w) nw+1 = 0= (20)
Hence {{Ww} solves (19), the resource constraint and (20). Since {w  {w31 / i 0 ({w)  i 0 ({w31),
we use (19) to conclude that: {Ww  {Ww31 /   1. Thus, there are three distinct cases
depending on the value of .
Case 1:  A 1= The optimal trajectory {Ww converge to {ˆ. It remains to determine {W0. There
are three families of candidates that are represented in the following phase diagram (see Figure
1).
6
-
{w
nw
{ˆ
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
""nw = nw
n0
?
¾
6¾ 6-
?
-
µ
I
Y
*
µ
µ
µ
1
-
Figure 1
The Þrst family of candidates is such that nw converges to 0. After a while, this convergence
is monotonic. With equation nw+1 =  (nw  {w) > this implies that {w converges to 0, which
is a contradiction. These trajectories are not optimal. The second family of candidates is
such that nw converge to +4. These trajectories do not satisfy the transversality condition.
Indeed, on the optimal path, one has:
wi 0 ({w) nw+1
w31i 0 ({w31) nw
=
nw+1
nw
= 1 {wnw
>
where the Þrst equality comes from (19) and the second from the resource constraint. There-
fore,
lim
w<+"
wi 0 ({w) nw+1
w31i 0 ({w31) nw
= 1 and lim
w<+"
wi 0 ({w) nw+1 $ +4=
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The third candidate is the saddle point solution for which nw converges to 31 {ˆ. This solution
satisÞes the transversality condition. Along the trajectory, the resource stock is monotonically
increasing.
Case 2:  ? 1. Because of the condition lim{<0 i 0 ({) = +4, the optimal trajectory
{Ww converges to 0. To determine {W0, one should study two families of candidates that are
represented in the following phase diagram (see Figure 2).
6
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nw
{ˆ
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"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
"
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?
-
ª
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ª
ª
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q
Figure 2
The Þrst family of candidates is such that nw converges to 0. Among them, only one is such
that {Ww converges to 0, while the others exhibit a sequence of {w that converges to positive
values, which is thus impossible. It remains for us to check that the good trajectory satisÞes
the transversality condition. On the optimal path, since nw converge to 0, one has:
wi 0 ({w) nw+1
w31i 0 ({w31) nw
=
nw+1
nw
? 1 ? 1>
from which we deduce that: limw<+" wi 0 ({w) nw+1 = 0= Along this path, the stock of the
resource decreases monotonically and is asymptotically exhausted.
The second family of candidates is such that nw converges to +4. As in Case 1, these
trajectories do not satisfy the transversality condition.
Case 3:  = 1. In this particular case, any constant solution solves (19). Let {W be the
optimal solution. Given the objective: max{w
"P
w=0
wi ({w), the closer {W is to {ˆ, the better. To
compute {W, we rewrite the resources dynamics such that:
nw+1 = w+1

n0  {W
1 w+1
1 
¸
>
and substitute this expression into (20) to obtain: limw<+" i 0 ({W)  [n0  {W@ (1 )] = 0=
The optimal solution is thus: {W = (1 ) n0 if (1 ) n0 ? {ˆ> and {W = {ˆ otherwise. The
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latter solution is eliminated on the assumption of resource scarcity. In the former, the stock
of resource is constant. ¤
We note that these results can be immediately extended to speciÞc technical progress. Let
us suppose for instance that: iw ({w) = Dwi ({w) = D0wi (=) with 1   ? 1@. The problem
can now be written as: max{w
"P
w=0
()w i ({w) > subject to the same constraint. The problem is
thus the same as (18), apart from the fact that we now compare  with .
Another way to introduce technical progress would be to suppose that iw ({w) = i (Dw{w)
with Dw = D0w and   1. The Þrst order condition (19) should then be replaced by:
i 0 (Dw31{w31) i 0 (Dw{w) = 0= DeÞning: ù{w = Dw{w and ùnw = Dwnw, the optimal solution can
thus be found by solving:
;
AA?
A=
ùnw+1  
³
ùnw  ù{w
´
= 0
i 0 (ù{w31) i 0 (ù{w) = 0
which is the same as the one studied previously, provided that  is replaced by .
Let us now turn to the characterization of the fair path of transfers {pWw}. From Proposi-
tion 1, we have:
pWw+1 =
wP
l=0
lil
¡
{Swl
¢

wP
l=0
lil ({Wl )
w+1 > (21)
for all w 5 N+> and where {Swl is the solution to max{l
wP
l=0
lil ({l) subject to the resource and
non-negativity constraints. As it has been discussed above, limw<+" {Swl = {Wl . Hence, by the
deÞnition of the maximum, pWw+1  0. However, we have seen that fair allocation exists if and
only if pWw+1  iw+1
¡
{Ww+1
¢
for all w 5 N+. We would like to stress that this condition is very
restrictive and is not satisÞed in many cases. Indeed, fair transfers are likely to increase over
time: each generation has to compensate the previous one for not exploiting the resource in
an autarkic way and also for having compensated the previous generation. Hence, as shown
in the following Lemma, fair transfers increase, at least for an initial interval of time.
Proposition 3 Fair transfers satisfy: pWw+2  pWw+1> for all w  w˜ 2,
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Proof
Using (21), pWw+2  pWw+1 if and only if:
wX
l=0
l
h
il
³
{Sw+1l
´
 il
¡
{Swl
¢i
+ w+1iw+1
³
{Sw+1w+1
´
 (1 )
wX
l=0
lil ({Wl )+ w+1iw+1
¡
{Ww+1
¢
We recall that w˜ relies on the scarcity of the resource and gives the date at which the resource
is depleted under autarky. Hence, for all w  w˜ 2, the resource is abundant and the optimal
exploitation is kept at the generations’ optimal extraction: i.e. {Sw+1l = {ˆl. The previous
inequality can hence be rewritten as:
(1 )
wX
l=0
lil ({ˆl) + w+1iw+1 ({ˆw+1)  (1 )
wX
l=0
lil ({Wl ) + w+1iw+1
¡
{Ww+1
¢
>
which, given that {ˆw  {Ww for all w from Proposition 2, is obviously satisÞed. ¤
Let us illustrate the existence problem driven by the increase of transfers over time by
a simple numerical application. Using Proposition 2, a speciÞc case can indeed be easily
derived. Suppose that  = 1> and that iw ({w) =
s{w for {w  {ˆ> where the value of {ˆ is
su!ciently high (e.g. {ˆ = n0).9 Thus, {Swl = (1 ) n0@ (1 w+1) for all l, and:
pWw+1 =
q
n0
(13)
³p
1 w+1  (1 w+1)
´
w+1 >
which can be shown to be an increasing function of time. Moreover, since {Wl = (1 ) n0 for all
l, the feasibility condition pWw+1  iw+1
¡
{Ww+1
¢
is rewritten as:
p
1 w+1  (1 w+2), which
is always satisÞed for low enough  and never satisÞed for large enough . For instance, pWw+1
and iw+1
¡
{Ww+1
¢
are plotted as (continuous) functions of time in the Þgures below for various
values of . The increasing dashed blue curve represents pWw+1 while the solid red line is the
constant iw+1
¡
{Ww+1
¢
. We see that the condition is satisÞed for  = 0=3 and  = 0=5, while it
is not for  = 0=7. To interpret this, let us recall that a larger  implies (in this very speciÞc
9More precisely, we need {ˆw A {l = (1 ) n0.
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case) a lower resource regeneration rate.
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It is worth mentioning that for  = 0=7, the feasibility condition is violated “from the be-
ginning”, that is, for the Þrst transfer p1 between the Þrst two generations 1 and 2. More
precisely, along the e!cient extraction path, the second generation has not enough production
to transfer to the Þrst generation to make it as well o as it would be under autarky. Indeed,
in this example, it is impossible to Þnd a compensation scheme that satisÞes the core lower
bounds for coalitions composed by two successive generations only. Therefore, relaxing the
core lower bounds by allowing coalitions of limited size to form does not guarantee existence.
To conclude this characterization of fair allocation let us discuss the dynamics of the
utilities of each generation xWw . The following Proposition gives a su!cient condition under
which the utilities decrease over time.
Proposition 4 For all w  2> xWw  xW1 if iw
¡
{Sww
¢
 i1 ({ˆ1).
Proof
The Proof of Proposition 1 implies that xW1 = i1 ({ˆ1). As a consequence, xWw  xW1 /
19
pWw+1 pw  i1 ({ˆ1) iw ({Ww ) > which using (21) implies that xWw  xW1 if and only if:
w31X
l=0
lil
¡
{Swl
¢

w31X
l=0
lil
³
{Sw31l
´
 w
£
i1 ({ˆ1) iw
¡
{Sww
¢¤
=
Using the deÞnition of a maximum, we observe that the left-hand side of the inequality is
negative, which is su!cient for us to conclude. ¤
A direct implication of this is that technical progress is a necessary condition for fair
allocation to keep the utilities at least constant. Indeed, if iw ({) = iw+1 ({) > then the maximal
production level decided by the Þrst generation cannot be overcome.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a fair allocation of a scarce resource over an inÞnite sequence
of overlapping generations. When it satisÞes two fairness criteria, namely the core lower
bounds and the aspiration upper bounds, the allocation is unique. The exploitation of the
resource is e!cient and there is no generation left without any resource. First generations are
compensated through a transfer scheme in which each generation is assigned its marginal
contribution to the preceding generation. Such a scheme is likely to induce an increase
in transfers over time that may cause the infeasibility of the allocation. Finally, technical
progress is necessary for avoiding the decrease of the utilities of future generations. One
remaining issue is the stability of the fair allocation, which is related to our last result. If
utilities decrease over time while the resource stock increases, future generations have an
incentive to deviate. This important question has been left for future research.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
This proof is adapted from Ambec and Ehlers (2008). Let |VV denote the solution of the
program deÞned by z(V) in (12) for any arbitrary coalition V  N+. As a Þrst step in the
proof of this lemma, let us show that if > 6= V  W  Q> then |VV  |WV = Clearly, it su!ces
to establish that |VV  |VwV whenever > 6= V 6= Q and w 5 Q\V= Let us write |VV = {V
and |VwV = |V. All agents under consideration in the argument belong to V. From the
deÞnition of { and |, PlMV |l  PlMV {l. Let l1  ===  lO be those l such that {l 6= |l (if
none exists, there is nothing to prove). We claim that |l1 ? {l1. Suppose, by contradiction,
that the opposite (necessarily strict) inequality is true. Let m be the smallest successor of l1
such that |m ? {m (which necessarily exists). Moreover, |m ? {ˆm since {m  {ˆm. We deÞne
|%l1 = |l1%> |%m = |m +m3l1%> |%l = |l for l 6= l1> m= Since i 0m(|m) A i 0m({m) and i 0l1({l1) A i 0l1(|l1)>
choosing % A 0 that is small enough (in particular such that |m + m3l1 ? {ˆm ) ensures
that
P
lMV lil(|%l ) A
P
lMV lil(|l) while |%V meets the same constraints as |V, which is a
contradiction. Since |l1 {l1 ? 0> it now follows that |lo {lo ? 0 successively for o = 2> ===> O=
Moving on to the second step, let V  W  Q and W ? l= We deÞne {0l = |Wll and
{0m = |Wlm + |Vm  |Wm for m 5 V= From our Þrst step, |Wlm  |Wm  |Vm for all m 5 V= Therefore
0  |Wlm  {0m  |Vm for all m 5 V and the consumption plan {0 for V ^ l satisÞes the same
constraints as |VlVl. Hence, z(V ^ l) 
P
mMVl mim({0m) and
z(V ^ l) z(V)  lil({0l) +
X
mMV
m[im({0m) im(|Vm )]= (22)
On the other hand, since |Wlm  |Wm for all m 5 W\V>
z(W ^ l) z(W )  lil({0l) +
X
mMV
m[im(|Wlm ) im(|Wm )]= (23)
Since {0m  |Vm = |Wlm  |Wm and |Wlm  {0m for all m 5 V> it follows from (22), (23), and the
concavity on the rising portion of im, that z(W ^ l)z(W )  z(V^ l)z(V). This completes
the proof of the lemma. ¤
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